For such requests, does Applicant confirm the identity of the requestor and authenticity of payment instructions by telephone with the requestor? If yes, is the validity of the telephone number confirmed?
This is application question 2 of 8 on the Capitol Indemnity Corporation (CapSpecialty) A-PL-SUPP-364. It is a control question and reaches 6 controls. The wording is the carrier's, quoted verbatim.
Held from the Cyber Crime Supplemental Application - Electronic Funds Transfers (form A-PL-SUPP-364 10-21) (read 2026-10-12), jurisdiction United States. All Capitol Indemnity Corporation (CapSpecialty) questions.
Facets: control: For such requests, does Applicant confirm the identity of the requestor and authenticity of payment instructions by telephone with the requestor? If yes, is the validity of the telephone number confirmed?
What this question reaches
- ISO 27001:2022 A.5.3: Segregation of duties (direct)
Establishes the verification step the wording names; it does not establish the wider payment approval workflow or the threshold above which a second approval applies.
Evidence to have on file: the documented callback or out-of-band procedure for verifying a change to supplier or payee bank details, naming who checks and how; a contact channel verified before the request was made, held independently of the message that asked for the change - ISO 27001:2022 A.5.19: Information security in supplier relationships (supporting)
Establishes the verification step the wording names; it does not establish the wider payment approval workflow or the threshold above which a second approval applies.
Evidence to have on file: the documented callback or out-of-band procedure for verifying a change to supplier or payee bank details, naming who checks and how; a contact channel verified before the request was made, held independently of the message that asked for the change - SOC 2 CC6.3: Role-based access, least privilege and segregation of duties (direct)
Establishes the verification step the wording names; it does not establish the wider payment approval workflow or the threshold above which a second approval applies.
Evidence to have on file: the documented callback or out-of-band procedure for verifying a change to supplier or payee bank details, naming who checks and how; a contact channel verified before the request was made, held independently of the message that asked for the change - SOC 2 CC3.3: Considering fraud risk (COSO principle 8) (supporting)
Establishes the verification step the wording names; it does not establish the wider payment approval workflow or the threshold above which a second approval applies.
Evidence to have on file: the documented callback or out-of-band procedure for verifying a change to supplier or payee bank details, naming who checks and how; a contact channel verified before the request was made, held independently of the message that asked for the change - NIST CSF 2.0 PR.AA-05: Access permissions, entitlements, and authorizations are defined in a policy, managed, enforced, and reviewed, and incorporate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties (direct)
Establishes the verification step the wording names; it does not establish the wider payment approval workflow or the threshold above which a second approval applies.
Evidence to have on file: the documented callback or out-of-band procedure for verifying a change to supplier or payee bank details, naming who checks and how; a contact channel verified before the request was made, held independently of the message that asked for the change - NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-05: Requirements to address cybersecurity risks in supply chains are established, prioritized, and integrated into contracts and other types of agreements with suppliers and other relevant third parties (supporting)
Establishes the verification step the wording names; it does not establish the wider payment approval workflow or the threshold above which a second approval applies.
Evidence to have on file: the documented callback or out-of-band procedure for verifying a change to supplier or payee bank details, naming who checks and how; a contact channel verified before the request was made, held independently of the message that asked for the change
Subject: payment_verification. Owner a broker routes it to: Finance and treasury owner.
The same control on other applications
Coalition Q6, Chubb Q21, Chubb Q22, Chubb Q23, Chubb Q24, Beazley Q20, Hiscox Q41, Hiscox Q67, Tokio Marine HCC Q30, Tokio Marine HCC Q31, Tokio Marine HCC Q32, AXIS Insurance Q58.
Map your own answers in the tool. See the Capitol Indemnity Corporation (CapSpecialty) page, the controls index, the island and the answers.